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Introduction
Controlling the emission of environment-damaging pollution caused by increased economic activity has received a considerable attention in the …eld of environmental economics.
Given that the pollution function is increasing in the output of the industry, we have the usual trade-o¤ between the price e¤ect and the negative externality. If we restrict the output the environment is cleaner but the price is higher.
International trade is playing an important role in expanding global economic activities and there is an increasing amount of literature regarding trade and the environment in trade theory 1 . However, there are not too many contributions regarding the e¤ects of trade liberalization in a dynamic context. What creates negative externality is the stock of pollution not just the current emission of pollution. Thus, we need a dynamic model to study the environmental e¤ect of trade liberalization due to the fact that pollution is accumulated over time. Fujiwara (2009) investigates the e¤ects of free trade on global stock of pollution using a two country di¤erential game model. We develop a two-country world di¤erential game model, where there is a polluting …rm in each country, to derive the open-loop and feedback equilibria of the game between …rms in case of autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade when there is transportation cost and also a Pigouvian tax is introduced to reduce damaging emissions.
Most of the existing contributions in the …eld of environmental economics examine the existence of Pigouvian taxation aimed at inducing …rms to reduce damaging emissions directly 2 or indirectly 3 . Accordingly, the common approach to deal with this problem in all of these studies is to derive the …rst best, where a social planner chooses a welfare maximizing production plan, and introduce corrective taxes to induce pro…t-seeking …rms to produce at socially optimum level. In our study, the game between social planners is not technically solvable. As a result, it is not possible to outline the social optimum.
However, we …gure out the market equilibrium and determine which one of the three cases of bilateral trade, unilateral trade or autarchy is the equilibrium of the game between two …rms according to the transportation cost and Pigouvian tax quantity. Then, we 1 Livernois (1992, 1994) , Long (1998, 2002) and Tsur and Zemel (2008) . 3 To this regard, see Downing and White (1986) , Milliman and Prince (1989) , Damania (1996) , Chiou and Hu (2001) and Tsur and Zemel (2002) , Dragone et al. (2009). determine the extent of tax amount for various quantities of negative externality to which social welfare coincides with market equilibrium.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 constructs a basic model. Section 3 brie ‡y outlines the static version of the game. In section 4, the di¤erential game is illustrated and the open-loop and feedback equilibria under autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade are characterized. Pro…ts and social welfares are assessed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
The Setup
There are two similar countries, indexed by i = 1; 2. In each country there is a …rm which produces a single output. Firms supply a homogenous good and their productions, q i , have two parts:
i; j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i;
where q ii and q ij denote the amounts of output produced by …rm i and consumes in domestic market and is exported to the other country, respectively. It is obvious that the second part becomes zero if there isn't any export.
Exporting …rm must pay an iceberg transportation cost which depends on the amount of export. In our setting, m 2 (0; 1] captures the e¤ect of transportation cost. If there is no transportation cost, m is equal to one. Therefore, the inverse demand function in each country is p i = a (q ii + mq ji ); i; j = 1; 2 and j 6 = i;
where q ji is the amount of goods which is exported by the …rm j into country i.
Technology is the same for both …rms and production takes place at constant returns to scale (CRS), with a constant marginal cost c. It is summarized by the cost function
Hence, …rm i's instantaneous pro…ts are
The production of the …nal output creates a negative externality in the form of polluting emissions' ‡ow E(t) = Q(t), which increases the stock of pollution, Z. Pollution is accumulated over time and is transboundary. The accumulation process of the world pollutant follows:
where k is the natural puri…cation rate of the pollutant.
The stock of pollution lowers the consumer surplus by the following rule:
where h measures the e¤ect of negative externality on consumers. However, the instantaneous social welfare in each country is the aggregate amount of …rm's pro…ts and consumer surplus:
By knowing this setting, we are deriving …rms'pro…t equilibria in autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade. We will compare these pro…ts as well as social welfares to obtain the trade strategy from the viewpoints of the both, the social planner and the …rms.
The Static Problem
As a preliminary step, in this section, we consider the static Cournot game in order to examine the case where …rms maximize their pro…t functions without taking into account the negative externality because of the lack of corrective tax. We consider the game in …gure 1 in which …rms make their trade strategy decision, where A i , T i ( N T i ) and BT i denote the optimal pro…t of …rm i in the case of autarchy, trade (not trade) in unilateral and bilateral trade, respectively. In autarchy case, there is no trade between the two countries and each …rm is monopolist in its own country with the optimal quantity level of (a c) =2. In the unilateral and bilateral trade where …rms play under Cournot competition, the equilibrium amount of outputs is summarized in lemma 1 and 2.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium amounts of …rms' output in unilateral trade under (static)
Cournot competition are
Proof. The maximization problem of trading and not trading …rms are
with the following necessary conditions (FOCs):
@ N T i @q jj = a 2q jj mq ij c = 0:
Consequently, the resulting levels of individual output are 
Proof. The maximization problem of …rms in case of bilateral trade, which is the same for both because of symmetry, would be
The …rst order conditions of this problem w.r.t. controls are
which leads to this solution:
Comparing the corresponding pro…ts on autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade, it is
Proposition 1 Under the static framework trade is dominant strategy for both …rms and
is the Nash equilibrium of the game where …rms decide to trade or not. This is a prisoner's dilemma game.
Proof. This follows from equilibrium in autarchy and lemmas 1 and 2. Now, we are interested in welfare comparison across the four cases which is summarized in:
Corollary 1 Under the static framework bilateral trade is Pareto e¢ cient if h < k 2 m 2 (5am + c(17m 22)) 4(m 2)(c(4 + m( 4 + 7m)) am(2 + 5m)) ;
which coincides the equilibrium of the …rms'game. Otherwise, social welfare has the most amount in the case of autarchy.
Proof. By plugging q ii , q ij , q jj and q ji into the stationary condition _ Z = 0, the steady state stock of pollution is obtained which in turn can be plugged into (2) in order to get social welfare amounts in autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade. Comparing the acquired welfares, we obtain the inequality.
Corollary 2
The less transportation cost is, the more bilateral trade is socially preferable.
Proof. The right hand side of the inequality (11) is increasing in m which means in order for bilateral trade becomes socially e¢ cient, h can have a larger value when transportation cost decreases. This concludes the proof.
However, trade liberalization would increase …rms'output which has two contradictory e¤ects on consumer surplus. Output increase, on the one hand, would directly raise consumer surplus, on the other hand, increases the stock of pollution which in turn reduces consumer surplus. Now, if inequality (11) holds or in the other words h is small enough, pollution increment does not reduce the consumer surplus that much and consumers will bene…t from output enlargement. But, we know that most of the time h is not su¢ ciently small.
The Dynamic Game
As it is said before, the production of …nal output creates a cross-boundary negative externality which is accumulated over time and follows the dynamic (1). Now, by introducing a corrective (Pigouvian) tax, in quadratic form, the …rms are forced to internalize the negative externality of pollution in a dynamic framework. Therefore, the …rm i's optimization problem is formulated as:
subject to (1) and Z(0) = Z 0 . Parameter r > 0 is a constant rate of discount common to all …rms and parameter s is a policy instrument that policy maker by manipulating it modi…es taxation. This taxation is not the same if …rms play open-loop or feedback.
In the remainder of this section, the problem is solved for the open-loop equilibrium and feedback equilibrium as well.
Open-Loop Solution
Here we characterize the open-loop equilibria of the three cases, starting with the autarchy which is the simplest one because there is only one supplier in each country. 
where OLA denotes the open-loop equilibrium at autarchy. Such a steady state is saddle point stable.
Proof. The Hamiltonian equation of …rm i is:
where i (t) = i (t) e t and i (t) is the co-state variable associated with Z(t). Consider the …rst-order condition w.r.t. q ii (t):
This yields the optimal open-loop output for the …rm i as follows 4 :
The adjoint equation for the optimum is
and the associated transversality condition is
Di¤erentiating (15), using (16) and symmetry assumption, we obtain
From (14), we know (t) = a + 2q (t) + c:
By substituting this into (17), we have
Therefore, the dynamic system can be rewritten in matrix form as follows:
Since the determinant of the above two-by-two matrix is negative, the equilibrium point is a saddle, with Proof. In unilateral trade, only one …rm exports. The Hamiltonian for the trading and not trading …rms are
o ;
o :
The …rst-order necessary conditions w.r.t. control variables, adjoint equations and associated transversality conditions for the optimum are
Di¤erentiating FOCs w.r.t. time and using adjoint equations we obtain the following control dynamical system:
Solving (28) together with (1), yields the stable steady state equilibrium point in (20) . Proof. As mentioned before, the two …rms and two countries are symmetric. Then, the Hamiltonian function of each …rm in bilateral trade is
Considering the …rst-order conditions, adjoint equations and associated transversality conditions:
yields the dynamics of …rm i's controls:
Solving (31) accompanied by the dynamics of …rm j's control variables and (1), fully characterizes the stable steady state equilibrium point in (29).
Feedback Solution
Here, we characterize a subgame perfect Cournot equilibrium in Markov strategies where …rms employ pollution dependent decision rules when maximizing their discounted pro…t.
Therefore, changes in the stock of pollution stimulate responses, through Pigouvian tax, by all players that are re ‡ected in their quantity choices.
Proposition 5 At the feedback Nash equilibrium under autarky, the steady state levels of the price and the individual output are
where F A denotes the feedback equilibrium at autarchy and e A = 1 3 2k + r p (2k + r) 2 + 6s ;
Proof. The Bellman equation of …rm i in autarchy is
where V i (Z (t)) is the value function of …rm i. Given the linear quadratic form of the maximand, we assume the quadratic value function:
so that
where e i , f i and g i are unknown coe¢ cients and the indication of time is omitted to ease the exposition. Taking the FOC w.r.t. q ii and using (34), we obtain:
where e A and f A can be calculated by using (35) and rewriting (32) as follows:
Equation (36) Proof. The Bellman equations of trading and not trading …rms in unilateral trade are 5 :
with the same value function form that was introduced before. Taking the FOCs w.r.t.
controls and using (34), we obtain:
By solving (43) and (44) simultaneously, the amounts of q F T ij and q F N T jj is taken. Using these and rewriting (40) or (41) as (36) and as the same procedure as the previous proof, we can calculate e T and f T . Proof. When there is trade between two countries, the Bellman equation of …rm i is
Taking the …rst order necessary conditions and using the similar procedure with the previous proofs leads to …nd the Nash equilibrium of the game in bilateral trade 6 . . In this region the pro…t of …rms in autarchy is greater than bilateral trade, therefore, this equilibrium is not pareto e¢ cient. In region II, there is not any unique equilibrium and …rms play a chicken game.
If …rms play simultaneously, they make a systematic mistake to reach the equilibrium, and if they play sequentially, the problem is who plays …rst and gains the enormous bene…ts of the trade. In the last region, III, because of high transportation cost, trade is not possible and autarchy is the equilibrium.
In …gure 3b, it is shown that which one of the three cases (autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade) is socially e¢ cient according to the amounts of negative externality and corrective tax rate. Similar to …gure 2b the solid line is for m = 1 and the dashed line is for m =m . In the region above the curves, bilateral trade is e¢ cient from the social planner point of view. In the other region autarchy is socially e¢ cient. Note that in some autarchy may be welfare improving provided that the point places in the region above the curve in …gure 2b and below the curve in …gure 3b. Therefore, to avoid this problem policy makers must determine s for any given exogenous pair of (h; s) to satisfy the stricter constraint.
Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have theoretically addressed e¤ects of trade liberalization in a two country world di¤erential polluting oligopoly game. We found out when …rms decide to trade or not, if the transportation cost is not too large, under the open-loop information they play a prisoner's dilemma in which trade is the dominant strategy for both otherwise they play autarchy. In order for trade to be dominant strategy in feedback information, the Pigouvian tax and transportation cost must have relatively lower values. For larger amounts of transportation cost and corrective tax, the equilibrium can be unilateral trade or autarchy.
By comparing social welfares in autarchy, unilateral and bilateral trade, we showed that, depending on the e¤ects of negative externality on consumer and the transportation cost, policy maker can determine the amount of Pigouvian tax so that market equilibrium coincides with socially e¢ cient equilibrium. This taxation is di¤erent if …rms are playing open-loop equilibrium as compare to the feedback equilibrium.
